HFRudolph hat geschrieben:Es gibt zahlreiche Indeterministen, die sich dennoch als Naturalisten bezeichnen.
"The causal closure of the physical domain: If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t." (J. Kim)
Man beachte das "if"! Das Geschlossenheitsprinzip besagt nicht, dass jedes physische Ereignis eine Ursache hat, sondern nur, dass es eine physische Ursache hat, wenn es überhaupt eine Ursache hat.
Und was den Indeterminismus anbelangt:
"Sometimes it is suggested that the indeterminism of modern quantum mechanics creates room for sui generis non-physical causes to influence the physical world. However, even if quantum mechanics implies that some physical effects are themselves undetermined, it provides no reason to doubt a quantum version of the causal closure thesis, to the effect that the chances of those effects are fully fixed by prior physical circumstances. And this alone is enough to rule out sui generis non-physical causes. For such sui generis causes, if they are to be genuinely efficiacious, must presumably make an independent difference to the chances of physical effects, and this in itself would be inconsistent with the quantum causal closure claim that such chances are already fixed by prior physical circumstances. Once more, it seems that anything that makes a difference to the physical realm must itself be physical."
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism)
"[T]he chances of all physical events are determined by earlier physical events plus physical laws, including the irreducibly statistical laws of quantum mechanics."
(Melnyk, Andrew. "Some Evidence for Physicalism." In Physicalism and Mental Causation, edited by Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, 155-172. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003. p. 160, fn. 7)